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Summary findings
Most people agree that -he soundness of macroeconomic  In 1970, only 34 countries - or 30 percent of the
policies should be judged by their efficacy in meeting the  International Monetary Fund's menmbership  - had
objectives of steady growth, full employment, stable  assumed Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement,
prices, and a viable external payments situation.  declaring their  currency convertible on current account
What people debate about are the links between  transactions. By 1997, this figure had increased to 77
macroeconomics and economic structure - and in the  percent.
current environment, the openness to foreign capital  Does financial integration  make it more difficult to
flows.  achieve macroeconomic stability? Apparently not,  on the
As developing countries become more integrated into  whole, although at times large short-term capital flows
international financial markets, volatility may becorne an  can lead to misaligned asset prices, including exchange
increasing fact of life. Faced with such volatility, how  rates.
should these countries frame their macroeconomic  What financial integration does do is limit how far
policies? What broad pr:nciples should guide their  countries can pursue policies incompatible with medium-
macroeconomic management?  term financial stabilitv. The disciplining effect of global
In many developing countries, the openness of the  financial and product markets applies not onily  to
capital account has been significant. Many countries have  policymakers - through  pressures on financial markets
made the transition toward an open-economic paradigm.  -but  also to the private sector.
As a result, fluctuations in international capital and  Rather than constrain the pursuit of appropriate
currency markets, as well as shifts in foreign investors'  policies, globalization may add leverage and flexibility to
attitudes and confidence, have greatly affected local  such policies, easing financing constraints and extending
stock market prices, the level of foreign exchange  the time during which countries can make adjustments.
reserves, and the scope for monetary and interest rate  But markets will provide this leeway only if they
policy.  perceive that countries are undertaking adjustments that
Capital controls and foreign exchange restrictions have  address fundamental imbalances.
been significantly dismaantled  in a number of developing
and transition economies.
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Most people are likely to agree that "sound policies" ought to be judged by their efficacy in
fulfilling the socio-economic objectives of steady growth, full employment, price stability, and a
viable external payments situation, as mandated by the prevailing socio-political consensus, and
framed by the underlying economic structure and institutions.  At this level of analysis, the
debate centers on the analysis of linkages between macroeconomics and economic structure,
principally, in the current international environment, openness to foreign capital flows.
Enhanced volatility may well be a longer-term fact of life facing developing countries as they
become more integrated with international financial markets.  The question is how to frame
macroeconomic policies in the presence of such volatility, and in particular what broad principles
should guide policy in several key areas of macroeconomic management.
From the macroeconomic perspective, the openness of capital account in many developing
countries has been significant; it has effected a transition toward an open-economy paradigm, in
which fluctuations in international capital and currency markets as well as shifts in foreign
investors'  sentiment and confidence now have an important bearing on the movement of local
stock market prices, the level of foreign exchange reserves, and the scope for monetary and
interest rate policy.  Capital controls  and foreign exchange restrictions have been significantly
dismantled in a number of  developing and transition economies.  In 1970, only 34 countries, or
30% of the IMF's membership, had assumed article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement,
declaring their currency convertible on capital account transactions.  This had increased to 143,
or 77%, by 1997.
Does financial integration make it more difficult to achieve macroeconomic stability?  On the
whole,  it would  seem not, even though  at times large short-term capital flows can adversely
affect macroeconomic stability, resulting in misaligned asset prices, including exchange rates.
What financial integration does, rather, is limit the scope for countries to pursue policies that are
incompatible with medium-term financial stability.  The disciplining effect of global financial
and product markets applies not only to policymakers, via financial market pressures, but also to
the private  sector.  Rather than acting as  a constraint  on the pursuit  of appropriate policies,
globalization  can  provide  added  leverage  and  flexibility  to  such  policies,  easing  financing
constraints  and  extending  the  time  period  over  which  countries  can  implement  needed
adjustments.  Markets will be willing to provide this leeway, however, only if they perceive that
countries really are undertaking adjustments that fundamentally address existing and prospective
imbalances.In this context, the paper emphasizes that:
*  Besides depending on the causes of capital inflows, appropriate policy responses will be
determined by the flexibility afforded by the underpinning institutional structure and the
existing policy stance.  Countries that pursue relatively balanced macroeconomic policies
will clearly find it easier to fashion an appropriate policy response while those pursuing
unbalanced policies will be more constrained in dealing with the disruptions caused by
inflows, or outflows.
*  Fiscal policy has a fundamental role to play since both the direction and magnitude of
capital  flows are likely  to  exhibit  sensitivity to  perceptions  of domestic public  sector
solvency.  FPotential  insolvency can generate large capital outflows and/or large interest
rate premia, as creditors try to avoid prospective taxation of domestic assets and demand
compensation for  exposing themselves  to the  risk of such taxation.  This  situation is
aggravated when the government makes explicit guarantees to creditors, since the value
of such guarantees will fluctuate with the government s perceived financial ability to back
them.  The upshot is that, in the context of high financial integration, the stock dimension
of fiscal policy, in the form of changes in the government's  perceived net worth, may
itself  represent  an  important  source  of  shocks to  the  domestic  economy,  transmitted
through the terms on which both domestic and foreign creditors are willing to hold claims
on the domestic economy.
;  Managing the exchange rate seems to be the revealed preference of most developing
countries.  The question is, how to manage a float?  The emergence of a perceived
misalignment and/or a lack of credibility of the commitment to the announced peg -- both
of which can happen in any managed exchange rate arrangement--could trigger such large
capital flows as to force the abandonment of the peg, as in the Mexican and ERM cases.
The paper also explores the linkage between macroeconomics and openness to foreign capital
flows, with particular reference to South Asia.  Over the past two years three South Asian
countries, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, have commemorated their 50 years of independence.
One distinctive feature of South Asian countries is the contrast between openness of polity and
economic openness of markets, entrepreneurship, and free choice.  There is a continued
adherence to planning, and despite deregulation, privatization and liberalization, still need to go
further in the direction of reducing the size and the role of the government.  South Asian
countries have appeared much more hesitant than other developing countries to open up to
international private finance, and inflation has been managed at relatively low levels despite
large fiscal deficits because of the financial repression that a closed economy supported.  The
unhappy consequence may have been a lower growth rate than would have happened in the
counterfactual.Table  of Contents
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I.  Introduction
Most people are likely to agree that "sound policies" ought to be judged by their efficacy
in fulfilling the socio-economic objectives of steady growth, full employment, price stability, and
a viable external payments situation, as mandated by the prevailing socio-political consensus,
and framed by the underlying economic structure and institutions.  At this level of analysis, the
question of "What macroeconomic policies are sound?" hinges on the role of the state within a
particular economic structure and institutions, and is sensitive in its prescription to the degree to
which the economy is open to international trade and finance.
Macroeconomics has influenced and been influenced by the evolution of social consensus
and the economic structure in a complex interactive manner over the past half century in both
developed and developing countries'.  In the industrial countries, the post-war consensus 2 born
out of the exigencies of World War II and the legacies of the Great Depression of the  1930s
established  the  model  of  the  "mixed  economy,"  and  "welfare  state,"  with  the  government
committed  to  full  employment 3. The role  envisaged  for  macroeconomic  policy  under  this
consensus, whether in the initial closed or its subsequent open economy paradigm,  was one of
short-term stabilization and "fine-tuning" of the economy.  Implicitly embodied in this model
'Macroeconomic  stability  is a prerequisite  of credibility  of a government's  commitment  to currency  convertibility,
which  in turn is the key element  of financial  integration.  For a description  of the macroeconomic  requirements  for
return  to convertibility  in the postwar  period  for Europe,  see Sachs  and Warner  (1995).
2 For a description  of the post-war  consensus  in the United  Kingdom,  for example,  see Skidelsky  (1990) and Yergin
(1998).
This is enshrined  for instance  in the Employment  Act of 1946  in the United  States.
1was a general confidence in the ability of the government to interact and manage effectively.
Armed with the Keynesian tool of demand management, this model yielded the "belle epoque"
macroeconomic performance of the  1950s and  1960s in the major industrial countries, but the
high and volatile  inflation of the  1970s set the stage for the reemergence of conservative and
liberal ideology, with its strategic aim price stability rather than full employment.  By the early
1  980s,  the  pendulum  had  swung:  "Ten  years  ago  government  was  widely  viewed  as  an
instrument to solve problems; today, government itself is widely viewed as the problem 4."
In the context of  developing countries, the macroeconomic policy model which  came
into prominence in the  1980s in  response to  the  debt crisis  of  the early part  of the  decade
assigned  a  dominant  role  to  external  balance  and  restoration  of  confidence  to  improve
creditworthiness.  This  association  with  external  constraints  has  led  a  to  disproportionate
focusing of attention on the relationship between domestic macropolicy and external balance.
From this perspective, macroeconomic policy has been closely related to the availability and
price of foreign capital, i.e., the supply curve, or the  constraint imposed by the balance  of
payments.  But  supply of  capital to  developing countries  tends to  be  highly correlated with
country  risk  perceptions,  as  assessed  by  ratings  assigned  by  credit  rating  agencies  to  the
country's  foreign currency debt obligations.  In assigning such ratings, agencies are known to
take into account numerous economic, social, and political factors, but the Asian crisis has raised
important concern about their performance'.
4 Owen  and  Schultze  (1976).
In  a study  of  the  behavior  of US  credit  agencies,  the  Moody's  and  Standard  and  Poor's,  Cantor  and  Packer  (1996)
found  that  the  main  factors  that  appear  to play  an important  role  in determining  a country's  rating  include:  per  capita
income,  GDP  growth,  inflation,  external  debt,  and  default  history.  The  authors  also  found  evidence  of a strong
relationship  between  ratings  and  market-determined  credit  spreads  of sovereign  bond  issues.  Haque  et  al (1996)
2II.  Salient economic features of the South Asia region
In this paper we explore the linkage between macroeconomics and economic structure,
principally, openness to foreign capital flows, with reference to South Asia.  Rather than tracing
the course of macroeconomic policy and performance in each individual member  country, the
approach here is to provide a general characterization of the region's  salient economic features,
to serve as a basis for exploring the role of macroeconomic policy 6. Over the past two years
three South Asian countries, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, have commemorated their 50 years
of independence.  This occasion has afforded an opportunity to take stock of the region's  past
achievements  and the  challenges facing  it in  the  emerging  era characterized  by  democratic
openness worldwide, the spread of information technology, and greater globalization.
o  Openness in polity  and hesitant opening in economy.  The challenge faced by South
Asia at independence was not  so much one of state building but nation building, a  challenge
thrust  upon  the  region  by  the  very  diversity  of  their  religious,  ethnolinguistic,  and  social
structure 7. Among the greatest achievements of these countries has been the ability to maintain
fairly  stable  constitutional  and  representative  democracies,  with  all  of  the  characteristics  of
"open" democracies including guarantees of basic human liberties and frequent, fair elections. In
found  that economic  fundamentals  affect  creditworthiness  perception  and  that a close  correlation  exists  between
country  credit  ratings  and capital  flows across  all country  groupings,  including  heavily indebted  countries.
Furthermore,  until recently  country  ratings  have shown  a consistent  overall  improvement  in creditworthiness.  This
improvement  was particularly  marked  between 1992  and 1996:  the average  country  risk in the Euromoney's  ranking
has increased  from 43.56 in March,  1993,  to 50.72  in March  1996,  and  the ratings  of 16  countries  in Asia,  LAC,  and
Eastern  Europe  were upgraded  between  September  1994,  and December  1996,  at least  by one of the two US major
agencies,  Moody's  and Standard  & Poor's. For an interesting  analysis  of credit  rating agencies'  failures  during  the
Asian  financial  crisis,  see Huhne  (1998).
6 See  Joshi  and Little  (1994)  for a historical  analysis  of macroeconomic  policy  in India;  also,  for an analysis  of
macro  issues in India,  Pakistan,  and Sri Lanka,  see Little,  Cooper,  Cordon,  and Rajapatirana  (1993).
For a fascinating  description  of the interplay  between  these  factors  in the case of India,  see Khilnani  (1997).
3India,  the  very  complexity  and  fragmentation  of  Indian  society  has  helped  the  cause  of
democracy in a significant way.  No one group has been strong enough to "capture" the state and
direct the resources of the state to itself.  Instead, many disparate groups compete for a piece of
the pie'.  The openness in  polity, however, has not  been, until  quite recently, echoed by an
economy open in terms of trade and finance.  For instance, India did not embrace the economic
component  of Western liberal democracy after independence from Great Britain as it did the
political  aspect, engaging in a  national agenda of import substitution and non-reliance on the
outside world, especially the developed world.  As part of a system that would become widely
known as the "license raj," India subjected imports to a complicated battery of regulations and
licensing  requirements, accompanied  by  high  customs  duties that  were  reduced  only  in the
1990s.  It is well documented that India's  orientation remained overwhelmingly inward-oriented
for  a longer period of time,  in  contrast to the  outward-oriented, export-driven  economies of
developing East Asian nations.  The contrast between openness of polity and economic openness
of markets, entrepreneurship, and free choice is a distinctive feature of India, as well as other
South Asian countries.
*  Aversion to domestic inflation.  Maintaining relatively low and stable inflation has
had considerable appeal in a democratic country such as India.  At political level, countering
inflation  has the  advantage of  appealing to  various  socio-economic  classes,  including  wage
earners and small savers, who are often the main victims of high and rising inflation.
8 Bardhan  (1984)  locates  the key for the survival  of the democratic  regime  in a contract  between  wealthy  farmers,
industrialists,  and  administrative  class. With limited  resources  and  not enough strength  to stand  alone,  these  groups
have bonded  together  in a coalition  of mutual  interest. See  also Kohli  (1989).
4Economically, the basic rationale is that inflation is very costly in terms of efficiency losses in
the  price  system,  increases in  uncertainty,  distortions  in  the  tax  system,  and  shortening of
investment horizons.  Thus, the loss in output and employment associated with stabilization is
viewed as being justifiable in lieu of future gains in efficiency and growth, which are assumed to
come with disinflation.  The difficulty that many democracies had faced in the past is to muster
necessary political  will to undertake the necessary stabilization measures in the form of fiscal
adjustment. The political base for budgetary austerity in South Asia, as in any other country, is
weaker and more fragmented, if it exists at all. Neither cutting back government expenditures nor
raising  taxes  are popular measures,  and  both  are  likely  to  undermnine some  existing  vested
interests and privileges. Those affected are likely to raise concern and opposition, and there exist
no countervailing groups with interest in budgetary austerity, at least not contemporaneously and
not before gains can be realized in the future in improved aggregate economic performance, that
could be relied upon as a political basis for  Figure  1
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9 The few instances  that some countries  have  succeeded  in foregoing  the necessary  political  consensus  for fiscal
adjustment  have been  because  of exceptional  circumstances,  signifying  important  turning  points  in their political
and ideological  trends.  Thus,  the considerable  fiscal  adjustment  achieved  in the industrial  countries  in the 1980s  was
consolidated  politically  by the resurgence  of a conservative  ideology,  and even that  was motivated  initially  by a
backlash  against  the high  and volatile  inflation  of the 1  970s.  Similarly,  in Latin America,  where  inflation  has been
historically  high  and volatile,  it has been  the growing  realization  of the long-term  cost of inflation  that  provided  the
necessary  political  consensus  for numerous  stabilization  efforts  attempted  in the 1980s  and 1990s.
5on average by 9.4% in the region from 1980 -1996,  compared to 15.6% per year for the world.
*  Grudging opening to international private finance.  Liberalization  in domestic
financial markets and increased financial and technological innovation have dramatically reduced
transaction costs for cross-border financial flows, and by any measure, the effect on the volume
of  international  financial  transactions  has  been  extraordinary.  For  instance,  cross-border
transactions in bonds and equities in the major advanced countries were less than 10  percent of
GDP in  1980 but  were generally well over  100 percent  of  GDP in  1995.  Additionally, the
average daily turnover in foreign exchange markets, which is particularly relevant to the ability
of monetary authorities to  influence exchange rates, has grown from about $200 billion in the
mid-1980s to around $1.2 trillion, equivalent to approximately 85 percent -f all countries' foreign
exchange reserves.
India and the rest of South Asia have appeared much more hesitant than other developing
countries to open up to international private finance.  In 1996, total private net capital flows to all
developing countries amounted to $246.51
Figure  2
billion,  according  to  World  Bank  Private  Capital  Flows
estimates,'0 which  represents  a  five-fold
300
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0
of  private  capital  flows  is  very  small,  - - - - - -
amounting  to  $8.74  billion  in  1997,
'° Global Development Finance, 1998
6equivalent to only 3.5% of all private flows to developing countries in 1995.
For  many  developing  countries,  large  Figure  3
private  capital  flows  through  foreign direct  South  Asia: Composition  of Foreign  Capital Flows
(1970 - 1997)
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main component  of external finance in the first  0
half  of  the  1990s.  Official  flows,  once  the  --
largest source of foreign capital for developing countries, have shrunk dramatically in the past
decade in all regions of the world.  Figure 3 demonstrates that South Asia is no exception, with
private capital flows becoming relatively more important in the mid- 1  990s.
III.  Degree of openness and financial market integration
The focus  in this  paper on  financial integration and  capital mobility  in  the nexus  of
macroeconomic and economic structure is justified  by virtue  of the fact that macroeconomic
policy affects the real economy largely through the credit and capital markets.  Does financial
integration make it more difficult to achieve macroeconomic stability?  On the whole, it would
seem  not,  even  though  at  times  large  short-term  capital  flows  can  adversely  affect
macroeconomic stability, resulting in misaligned asset prices, including exchange rates.  What
financial  integration does, rather,  is limit the  scope for  countries to  pursue policies  that  are
incompatible with medium-term  financial stability.  The disciplining effect of global financial
and product markets applies not only to policymakers, via financial market pressures, but also to
7the private sector, by making it more difficult to sustain unwarranted wage increases and price
markups.  Rather than acting as a constraint on the pursuit of appropriate policies, globalization
can provide added leverage to such policies.  It may also provide added flexibility. The greater
international mobility of private  capital, by easing financing constraints,  can extend the time
period over which countries  can implement needed  adjustments.  Markets  will be willing  to
provide  this  leeway,  however,  only  if  they  perceive  that  countries  really  are  undertaking
adjustments that fundamentally address existing and prospective imbalances.  Otherwise, markets
will eventually exert their own discipline, in such a way that the time period for adjustment may
be brutally shortened.
The trend  towards  economic  openness  and  financial  integration  has  been  gathering
momentum since the seventies in terms of increased capital mobility, institutional development
in the depth and sophistication of money, credit, capital, and Forex markets, and the availability
of associated derivative instruments for hedging currency and interest rate risks.  Capital controls
and foreign exchange restrictions have been significantly dismantled in a number of  developing
and transition economies.  In  1970, only 34  Figure  4
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This had increased  to  143, or 77%, by 1997  1 *Article  VI1Imembers  U All MemberC  ountries
(see figure 4).
8Box 1: Liberalization  of Capital  Accounts  and Foreign  Exchange  Regulations  in India
The liberalization of  India's foreign exchange policy and  regulations has  been a
centerpiece  of government's  economic  reforms  and opening  up to foreign trade  and investment.
In a phase manner,  the authorities  have moved over the past five years  to relax restrictions  on
capital  transactions,  beginning  with those on trade-related  and foreign investment  inflows. India
assumed  Article Vil  status in August 1994, thereby declaring  the Rupee  fully convertible on
current account transactions. Achievement  of capital account convertibility  remains a stated
policy goal, with progress  to date involving  selective relaxation/removal  of controls on foreign
investments  in corporate securities, non-residents  deposits in commercial banks, and direct
investment  in manufacturing  as well as in the core  infrastructural  sectors  of power, oil and gas,
highways,  ports, roads,  and telecommunications.  The existing regulations,  provided under the
Foreign  Exchange  Regulation  Act (FERA)  of 1973 and the amended  act of 1993, allows  capital
transaction  on both long and short-term instruments  under stipulated  quantitative  limits.  The
management  of the exchange  rate policy in such an environment  has been a challenging  task,
and recent experience  illustrates the dilemma facing the authorities in orchestrating  greater
flexibility  in the exchange  rate, while maintaining  market  confidence.
Five  South  Asian  countries  -
Figure 5
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Soua: EicOnseAngS  ndE0@np  9eadiew,IMF,  1997
macroeconomic, regulatory,  and  prudential  AD
policies.
Figure  6 provides a list of IMF  member countries according to  degree of openness to
current account  transactions  as of  1996.  Drawing on  the IMF Annual  Report on Exchange
9Arrangements  and  Exchange  Restrictions,  a  quantitative measurement  of  openness  for  each
country is developed by assigning a dummy variable value of I in the presence of any of the 13
specific  restrictions  listed  in  Table  1, and  zero  otherwise.  The  dummy  variables  are  then
aggregated, giving an overall indicator of the amount of restrictions  in a  given country.  It is
interesting to note that South Asian countries, especially Sri Lanka and Nepal, are generally quite
open, though India has a larger number of restrictions on the current account.  No South Asian
country, however,  has current account restrictions  in more than half of the  IMF categories.
Similarly, Figure 7 and Table 2 provide information on the degree of openness in capital account
transactions,  compiled  in  the  same  manner  described  above  with  country-specific  dummy
variables given a value based on the existence or lack of restrictions in  10 categories.  In this
regard, South Asian countries are more closed, with Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka displaying














n  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  1  0  1  1  1  2  1  3
Open  Partially Open  *  Closed
Table  1
Restrictions  on Exchange  and Trade  Systems
Type  No. of Countries
More  than  one exchange  rate  28
More  than  one rate  for imports  23
More  than  one rate  for exports  23
Import  rates  different  from export  rates  22
Payment  arrears  51
Bilateral  payment  arrangements:
With members  52
With non-members  16
Payments  restrictions
For  current  transactions  59
For  capital  transactions  124
Cost-related  import  restrictions
Import  surcharges  42
Advance  import  deposits  9
Export  proceeds
Repatriation  requirement  121
Surrender  requirement  93
Source:  Author's  estimate  based  on information  from Exchange  Arrangements  and Exchange
Restrictions,  IMF, 1996
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Table  2'
Restrictions  on Capital  Transactions
Type  No. of Countries
Capital  market  securities  128
Money  market  instruments  112
Collective  investment  securities  107
Derivatives  and other instruments  78
Commercial  credits  103
Financial  credits  76
Guarantees,  sureties,  and  financial  82
Direct  investment  144
Liquidation  of direct  investment  54
Real  estate  transactions  119
Source:  Author's  estimate  based  on information  from Exchange  Arrangements  and Exchange
Restrictions, IMF, 1997
12IV.  Financial integration: Longer-term macroeconomic policy considerations
From  the  macroeconomic  perspective,  the  openness  of  capital  account  in  many
developing countries has been significant; it has effected a transition toward an open-economy
paradigm, in which fluctuations in international capital and currency markets as well as shifts in
foreign investors' sentiment and confidence now have an important bearing on the movement of
local stock market prices, the level of foreign exchange reserves, and the scope for monetary and
interest rate policy.  Thus, financially-integrated developing countries find themselves operating
in  a  very  different macroeconomic environment today,  one in  which  capital  movements  are
highly sensitive to changes in prospective foreign and domestic rates of return.
Indeed,  viewed  from  the  perspective  of  the  past  three  decades  the  relationship  of
developing  countries to  international private  finance has been characterized by volatility  and
cycles  of  excessive  optimism  and  pessimism:  The  expansion  of  commercial  bank  lending
expanded in the  1970s ended with the debt crisis of the early 1980s, which was followed by a
resumption of capital flows to emerging market economies, and culminated in a currency crisis
in  Mexico in  the  winter  of  1994-1995."  Mexico's  particular  macroeconomic  and  external
liability  profile, i.e. its  large  concentration of short-term foreign debt, pegged  exchange rate
regime, and the special political circumstances preceding the crisis gave support to the view that
other countries were not likely to face the same fate as Mexico as long as their macroeconomic
policies remained on track..
"  For detailed  descriptions  of Mexico's  peso  crisis, see Dornbusch,  Goldfarn,  and  Valdes  (1995) and Sachs,
Tornell,  and Velasco  (1996).
13This  assumption  has  been  challenged  recently  by  the  currency  and  financial  crisis
engulfing  East  Asian  countries  (such  as  Thailand,  Malaysia,  Indonesia,  and  Korea)  with
traditionally high domestic saving rates, robust growth, and seemingly prudent fiscal stances (see
Dailami 1998).
Box 2:  Volatility in the supply of foreign capital
Shifts in the supply  of foreign capital  have been  triggered  by exogenous  factors,  such as
the increase in oil prices in the  1970s, the deregulation of  pension funds and  insurance
companies  in major industrial  countries  in the late 1980s,  or as a result  of institutional  innovation
and competition.  Greater access to  foreign capital in the developing countries opens the
possibilities  of financing  a broader  set of investment  projects,  sound as well as ones of a riskier
nature.  In the current environment,  the institutional  framework and mechanisms  for efficient
international  risk-sharing  is limited,  and progress  in building  the necessary  institutional  capacity,
market  development,  and transparent  regulation  for proper loan appraisal  and risk management
is lagging. Under  these conditions,  unviable  projects can be funded, exposing both  the private
borrower  and the intermediary  to default risks. Once the domestic macroeconomic  situation  or
international  competitiveness  changes, it  is not only the  risky projects that could fail, but
profitable  ones as vvell. In such situations,  Figure  8
the creditworthiness  of private entities with
foreign  currency  debt  obligations  is  Supply oFreignoailt
undermined  not  only  because  of
deterioration  in business  environment  - i.e.
rising domestic interest rates, falling stock  bgtmoney
Cost  Of  ..... bgt  mne
market  prices, and  economic recession  Capital
(spread~~~~~~~eaymoe
which seems to  characteristically  follow a  (soed  X
financial crisis - but also because of  a
higher  likelihood that  governments will
intervene  in foreign exchange  markets and  higherrating  lower  rating
Country  Risk
impose controls on currency convertibility  (as measured  by country  rating)
and transferability  (see  figure 8).
14Short of  the crisis situation associated with vulnerability, cross-border capital flows may
exhibit substantial volatility -- i.e., temporary shocks resulting in above-normal values either of
capital inflows or outflows  arising from changes in world  economic conditions or from  less
extreme changes in portfolio managers' perceptions of domestic creditworthiness than implied in
a crisis situation.  Enhanced volatility may well be a longer-term fact of life facing developing
countries as they become more integrated with international financial markets, even after stock-
adjustment inflows associated with the move to enhanced financial integration have tapered off,
and even if severe crises are avoided. The question is how to frame macroeconomic policies in
the presence of such volatility, and in particular what broad principles  should guide policy in
several key areas of macroeconomic management.
We will assume in the following that the objectives of macroeconomic policy would be to
provide  stable  non-inflationary environment that  fosters  economic  growth.  From  a  broader
policy perspective, especially in a poor economy, the generation of quality growth -- sustained
increases in domestic incomes combined with sustained reductions in the absolute numbers of
those  living in  poverty -- is of paramount  importance.  Inflation  and unsustainable  levels of
indebtedness  which  can  lead  to  growth  slowdowns  are  avoided  primarily  to  provide  and
environment for sustained growth.
From this vantage point, perhaps the most interesting conclusion that one can draw from
the  East Asian  crisis as  well as the  South  Asian experience,  is that  without macro-stability
investment and growth may slow down.
As the new growth literature also emphasizes, the maintenance of low inflation and a
reasonably conservative balance of payments scenario may be necessary for growth, but will still
15not  generate  long-terrn  growth  if  other  factors  conducive  to  generation  and  absorption  of
technical knowledge, i.e. knowledge capital are not present. 12  We will return to this issue at a
later stage after we examine the issue of "What macroeconomic policies are sound?"
1.  The imperative of maintaining public sector solvency
Fiscal  policy  has  a  fundamental  role  to  play  in  the  context  of  increased  financial
integration since both the direction and magnitude of capital flows are likely to exhibit sensitivity
to  perceptions  of  domestic  public  sector solvency.  Potential  insolvency  can generate  large
capital outflows and/or large interest rate premia, as creditors try to avoid prospective taxation of
domestic assets ancl demand compensation for exposing themselves to the risk of such taxation
by  continuing  to  lend  in  the  domestic  economy.  This  situation  is  aggravated  when  the
government  makes  explicit  guarantees  to  creditors,  since the value  of  such  guarantees  will
fluctuate with the government s perceived financial ability to back them.  The upshot is that, in
the context of highi financial integration, the  stock dimension of fiscal policy, in the form of
changes in the government's  perceived net worth, may itself represent an important source of
shocks to the domestic  economy, transmitted  through the terms on which  both domestic  and
foreign creditors are willing to hold claims on the domestic economy.
The  stock  and  flow  dimension  of fiscal  policy  are not  independent.  A critical  link
between them is created by the fact that what matters for creditors is the perceived solvency of
the public sector.  For a government whose long-run fiscal stance is uncertain, short-run policy
changes will be scrutinized for the information they may contain about the government's longer-
run  intentions.  Klowing  this,  governments  may  be  reluctant  to  act  in  ways  that  may  be
12  See  Chui  et al.  (1998)  for an interesting  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  openness  and  economic  growth.
16perceived  as  sending  the  "wrong"  signal  to  creditors,  and  this  reluctance  may  limit  the
government's  short-run policy flexibility.  Thus, achieving a reputation for fiscal responsibility
may maximize the government s short-run policy flexibility.
2.  Signaling credibility
While public-sector solvency requires that the public sector's  comprehensive net worth
be  positive,  preserving macroeconomic  stability in  a  financially-integrated  environment may
impose stricter conditions on the public sector's  balance sheet.  The composition of assets and
liabilities may matter as well.  Even a solvent public sector (i.e., one that can credibly honor its
obligations  over a  sufficiently long horizon) may be  vulnerable to  short-run liquidity crises.
Expectations of debt-servicing difficulties can turn out to be self-fulfilling.  The likelihood of a
"debt run" depends on the maturity and currency composition of the public sector's  liabilities
relative to that of its assets -- i.e., on the government's debt management policies.
In  managing  its  debt composition,  the  government faces a  difficult tradeoff between
enhancing its credibility, on the one hand, and exposing itself to liquidity crises, on the other.
Long-term  (fixed-interest)  domestic-currency  denominated  (nominal)  debt,  unlike  short-term
foreign currency debt -- can effectively be repudiated through inflation and/or devaluation, which
reduces its real value.  Given the nominal interest rate on this debt, it may indeed be sensible for
a  welfare-maximizing  government  to  do  so,  especially  in  circumstances  where  productive
expenditures can be sustained or distortionary taxes can be reduced.  However, the prospect of
the government's  exercise of this option would raise domestic nominal interest rates, making it
expensive for the government to borrow long-term in nominal terms.  Even when the government
17does not intend to behave in this fashion, the possibility of time-inconsistency may not convince
creditors of its honorable intentions.  To reduce its borrowing costs the government may thus be
induced to borrow short-term and in foreign currency.  By doing so, it ties its hands, eschewing
the option to gain from  devaluation and/or inflation at the expense of its creditors,  and thus
enhances the credibility of its promise to do neither.  The problem is, of course, that in doing so
it incurs  liquid  foreign-currency denominated  liabilities,  thereby making  itself  vulnerable to
"debt runs" of the type described previously.  The Mexican Tesobono crisis was an example of
such a run.
Creditors can rationally expect the government to forgo the option to inflate away the real
value of their assets if the government is institutionally unable to do  so, if it is perceived as
placing a high value on the credibility of its policy announcements and/or if inflating creates few
net benefits from the government's perspective.  In a recent paper, Dailami and Leipziger (1997)
showed that foreign creditors are particularly sensitive to local rates of inflation in pricing their
foreign currency loans.  The risk premium attached to  such loans was shown to be positively
related to the domestic rate of inflation, and furthermore, there is evidence that countries with
domestic inflation exceeding a benchmark rate have been further penalized with the imposition
of a high-risk premium on such loans.  Thus, the government can avoid making its borrowing
costs  overly  sensitive  to  the  composition  of  its  debt  by  creating  institutions  that  limit  its
discretion (e.g., by increasing the independence of the central bank), by establishing a reputation
for nondiscretionary behavior, and by choosing levels of expenditure and mobilizing sources of
taxation that minimize distortions.' 3 Under these circumstances, the option to borrow long-term
When  credibility  problems  become  extreme,  the government  s financing  problems  may become  sufficiently
18in domestic-currency terms may be retained and the likelihood that macroeconomic stability will
be  impaired by  the emergence  of "runs"  on  government  debt would be  minimized.  In the
absence of a reputation for resisting incentives to act in a discretionary fashion, and when the
government's  revenue  needs  are  high  and  conventional  taxation  is  highly  distortionary,
governments will lack credibility and creditors' fears will be heightened.
3.  The need for fiscal flexibility
Consider the case of a "pure" external financial shock for a country with well-integrated
financial markets.  In this case, sterilized intervention is not an option as policymakers have only
one independent monetary policy  instrument -- either the exchange rate or fixing a  monetary
target.  Faced by an external financial shock, the domestic monetary authorities can choose a
value either  for the exchange  rate or for the domestic  money supply (and thus  the domestic
interest rate), but not for both independently. When both the  level and composition of aggregate
demand are important to the authorities, they will find themselves one instrument short. In this
case,  they  may  face  an  unpleasant  choice  between,  say,  stabilizing  domestic  demand  and
safeguarding the competitiveness of exports.
This tradeoff suggests an important role for short-run fiscal flexibility. To the extent that
fiscal policy can be counted upon to sustain the level of aggregate demand at its pre-shock value
(by adopting a more or less expansionary stance as needed), it would be possible to provide a
policy for a more managed exchange regime. Monetary response can then be chosen to achieve a
desired composition of aggregate demand through an appropriate adjustment in the real exchange
severe  as to warrant  the adoption  of institutional  devices  that greatly  circumscribe  the its freedom  of action  --
i.e., adopting  a currency  board or joining a currency  union. The position  taken in this paper  that such
arrangements are not necessarily mandated in a highly financially integrated environment reflects the judgment
19rate. In the absence of short-run fiscal flexibility, as indicated above, the nature of the monetary
response may depend on tradeoffs between the level and composition of demand.
4.  Taxation under globalization
In  addition  to  the  implications  for  the  conduct  of  monetary  and  fiscal  polices,
globalization  also  has  implications  for  countries'  tax  systems.  The  origins  of  national  tax
systems and the current structure of government spending can be traced back to a period with
substantially  less  open  economies  and  lower  factor  mobility.  Correspondingly, taxation  is
largely based on the "territoriality principle," that is, the right to tax incomes and activities within
the  territory  of the jurisdiction.  In  an  increasingly global  environment,  this  principle loses
efficiency and can prove to be a potential source of conflict." 4
Globalization  may be  expected  increasingly to  constrain  governments'  choice  of tax
structures  and  tax  rates,  especially  in  smaller  countries.  Internationally  mobile  factors  of
production-financial  capital and  some  highly trained  segments of the labor market can more
easily avoid taxes levied in particular countries.  The scope for tax evasion by individuals and
corporations has also been enhanced.  Indeed, many countries have experienced an erosion of the
capital  income tax base.  Some  governments have responded  to  the  erosion  by establishing
favorable tax regimes.  This "tax competition" may affect the average tax level of some countries
by obliging them to lower tax rates for certain taxes.  To the extent that the allocation of capital
will be driven by tax considerations rather than by pretax rates of return, the allocation of capital
will be less efficient.  In a similar vein, personal income taxes and expenditure policies related to
that  the majority  of countries  have not in recent  years faced  credibility  problems  of this degree  of severity.
4  For a detailed  discussion  of these issues  see Tanzi (1995  and 1996).
20social spending are likely to become a more important factor in labor migration.  Presumably,
globalization  will  increasingly  tend  to  cause  tax  systems  to  converge  either  through  tax
harmonization or via tax competition across jurisdictions.
5.  Monetary and exchange rate regime
In the past, countries have relied on financial repression and direct controls which often
entailed the use of  punitive measures that segmented their economies from the rest of the world.
Partly in recognition of the inefficiencies, caused by those policies and in no small way because
of a global trend towards openness (manifested in financial market integration and large capital
flows), many  countries have  moved to  more open  and  market  based  policies  and  monetary
management--with an increasingly dedicated aim of price stabilization in most cases. As such,
monetary management, broadly speaking, will now have to be cognizant of  the constraints of the
new environment of  internal and external liberalization.
The "price"  of base money can be seen in three different ways (loosely at least) -- i.e.,
relative to domestic goods and services (i.e., the inverse of the price level), relative to foreign
monies (the nominal exchange rate), and relative to future domestic money (the interest rate).
These three prices  are linked  by  important relationships  that  market  forces  will ensure  will
prevail.
1  )  The principle  of arbitrage  suggests  that the ex-ante  risk-adjusted
rates of return will be equalized  across all assets. In the choice between
instruments denominated in  domestic and  foreign currency, not only
interest  rates prevailing  in intermational  markets  matter but also any change
in valuation  which can arise from exchange  rate variations.
2)  In the long run, the domestic  price level and the exchange  rate
are ultimately  underpinned  by purchasing  power parity where the relative
price of home goods to foreign  goods is determined  by the final demands
for the two goods.
21Because of these linkages, there is the 'impossible trinity,'  i.e., that monetary aggregates,
exchange rates and interest ra.es  cannot all be  fixed by the monetary authorities.  The central
bank  can determine  only one  nominal variable:  the level  of the monetary  aggregate, M, the
interest rate, i, or the exchange rate, e.  The choice of M as a policy variable corresponds to a
flexible  exchange  rate  regime  where  the  exchange  rate  and  interest  rates  adjust  to  equate
aggregate supply and demand.  In such a system, the authorities can also choose whether to set
the interest rate to al]Low  the exchange rate and money supply to be endogenously determined.
When the exchange  rate  is chosen as a policy  anchor, in the case for example of a fixed or
pegged  exchange  rate  regime.  M  and  i  are  endogenous.  With  a  fixed  exchange  rate,
disequilibrium  in  the  domestic  money  market  would  ultimately  be  eliminated  through  the
balance of payments'  .
Where  substantial,  even  if  not  perfect  capital  mobility  has  been  attained,  either
conspicuously through liberalization moves, or less directly through erosion and circumvention
of exchange controls, the basic principle that must drive monetary and exchange management is
that  interest  and exchange  rates  are two  sides  of the  same coin. Put  another  way, they  are
essentially the same instrument, and it is not possible to use them to pursue two different goals at
the  same time.  Nor  is  it in  general desirable  to  do so  since pursuit  of  different  short-term
objectives, and even just the ability to switch between these objectives, is the very crux of the
15 Like  any monopolist,  the central  bank can set either  the price or the quantity  of the product  it monopolizes,
but not both at the same  time in a market-based  regime. If the central  bank sets  the volume  of base  money,  it
cannot set independently  any of the facets  of the price of base  money;  conversely,  if it sets, say, the exchange
rate directly,  the central  bank cannot independently  set the volume  of base  money,  nor can it independently  set
the other facets  of the price dimension;  the same  applies  to the central  bank setting  the interest  rate. What  it can
do, however,  is to use one variable  as a means  to an end  defined  in terms of another  variable--i.e.,  it can use a
base money  or an exchange  rate  target  to achieve  a domestic  price  inflation  goal,  for example,  or it can use  an
22time inconsistency problem in monetary policy, of which we have all become very aware. There
may be occasions when shocks of various sorts are simply too large to be accommodated without
a temporary change of objective (e.g., a major terms of trade shock or a major banking crisis). In
such situations some form of safety valve is likely to be needed in the monetary and exchange
operating framework. But the ongoing need is to manage these shocks in a way that assures a
return to the basic policy objective as soon as possible, and minimizes the damage to market
confidence that such a return may be delayed unduly or too easily reversible in future.
The only real qualification to the aforementioned principle is in respect of the time scale.
Capital mobility may not be perfect in the very short-term, even if it is in the slightly longer
term. This may give some scope for additional policy flexibility, but only of a very limited sort.
The time-varying risk premium which leaves scope for some very short-term flexibility is not
something that can be arbitrarily manipulated by the authorities. Rather, the  success of shorter-
term policy flexibility in the limited circumstances where it is feasible,  is predicated importantly
on  the  markets'  assessment  of  the  credibility,  coherence  and  consistency  of  monetary  and
exchange management over time, including the broader supporting economic policy framework,
especially fiscal and public debt management policy.
Taking as given that the ultimate objective of monetary and exchange arrangements is
achieving/maintaining some concept of price stability, over the medium to longer term, the first
important decision to take in determining the choice of operating framework is the determination
of a "nominal anchor".  In principle, the anchor role could be played by the exchange rate, by
control of some monetary aggregate, by nominal income targets, or by direct inflation targets.  In
interest  rate  or  base  money  target  to achieve  an exchange  rate  objective.
23the case of  a norminal exchange rate anchor, there is also the basic question of exchange rate
regime choice--fixed or pegged, where the central bank sets the market exchange rate directly,
and then stands in the foreign exchange market to meet whatever excess demand (positive or
negative) results;  or  less directly  managed,  where the  central bank  does not  set the market
exchange rate directly but nevertheless  may target a  specific level of the rate through market
operations.
Several features  of the  economy  are likely  to  influence the  choice  of monetary  and
exchange  management  framework. For instance, the more  open  the economy (the larger the
traded goods sector relative to the economy, and the stronger the effect of traded goods prices on
the overall domestic price level), the more likely the use of the exchange rate as one of the more
important indicators or targets, or even an anchor. Conversely, if the economy is particularly
vulnerable to large external shocks (partly depending on the composition and direction of trade,
and the extent of specialization in both regards), it may not be desirable to manage the nominal
exchange rate too closely since this may restrict the scope for more efficient real exchange rate
adjustment.
Where stabilization and liberalization programs  have advanced sufficiently, significant
capital inflows have often occurred. It is ironic, perhaps, that what is essentially the markets'
endorsement of a much improved economic environment should then become a policy dilemma
itself for many countries. It is at this  stage, faced with choices between nominal appreciation,
mounting  interest  costs  from  sterilized  intervention,  or  money  expansion  and  consequent
inflation  risks,  that  the  inter-linkages  and  trade-offs  inherent  in  money  and  exchange
management become perhaps most  obvious--especially when fiscal measures (or other actions
24like trade and industrial reforms, or further liberalization of foreign exchange outflows) are not
readily available in the shorter-term to ease the trade-offs.  In many, though not all cases, the
experience of large capital inflows has eventually forced central banks to move to rather more
flexible exchange rate regimes. In some others, the authorities have resorted to capital controls or
other regulatory measures to discourage inflows, in an effort to avoid making the choice between
appreciation, sterilization or inflation. How long such measures retain sufficient effectiveness is a
moot point,  since they are generally inherently  incentive-incompatible; at best, they can buy
some time for more coherent policy action.
Relevant to the choice of money or exchange market intervention methods is the relative
stage of foreign exchange and domestic money/securities market development, which, in turn,
may partly reflect a range of historical, institutional, taxation or regulatory factors.  To  some
extent,  the volume  and nature of central bank's  own transactions may help stimulate market
development in  the relevant market,  or related financial markets. While  market  development
would  be  not  be  an  objective  in  its  own right  for the  central bank,  it  might  take  market
development  considerations  into account  in the  details  of the  design  and  implementation  of
particular monetary  and exchange  instruments, since these latter aspects will impinge  on the
nature and strength of market development.
Many developing and transition economies are particularly constrained by key markets or
instruments that may be at very early stages of development. Markets may not be linked well
enough to allow a properly coordinated policy framework.  For example, the effective operation
of monetary policy by means of indirect instruments in these countries generally requires that
there should be a reasonably efficient payments system, and transmission of interest rate effects.
25Even in those cases, though, there is growing evidence that adoption of indirect instruments has
enabled authorities to manage monetary conditions more effectively. So the incentive is there for
countries to push forward with structural reforms as conditions permit.'6
Apart from the more technical factors discussed above, there are some broader aspects of
the  economic  environment that  may  impact  on  the  choice  of  operating  framework.  The
magnitude of the fiscal deficit and outstanding public debt (including foreign currency debt) can
not only affect monetary and exchange rate policies but also the choice of operating regime.  For
example, if the fiscal and public debt situation is such that confidence is lacking in the domestic
financial policy  framework as a  whole,  this  may make the  maintenance of  fixed or  pegged
regimes  difficult  to  sustain,  and  regimes  with  more  flexible  exchange  rates  preferable.
Conversely, the type of monetary and exchange regime could impose an effective constraint on
fiscal policy and encourage fiscal consolidation although views differ about whether more fixed
or more flexible exchange rate regimes provide more effective discipline on fiscal policy.  The
issue  revolves  in  part  around  whether  quantitative  external  borrowing  constraints  for  the
government  are  binding--if  not,  a  fixed  exchange  rate  system  may  not  be  as  immediate  a
discipline on  fiscal  policy  as  a  more  flexible  system  where  an  unpleasant  surprise  for  the
markets, in the form of a deterioration in fiscal performance, may be reflected more quickly in an
exchange rate depreciation and an increase in local interest rates.
Fragility  in the banking system that may need some  flexibility  in terms of providing
additional central bank liquidity either to the system as a whole, or specific banks within it, tends
to militate against strictly rule-based regimes (such as those in  the form of a  currency board
16 See  Alexander,  et a] (I995) for a discussion  of the requirements  of the transition  to indirect  instruments  of
26arrangement, or money base targeting, for example).  This does not necessarily mean that rules-
based or strict targeting regimes cannot be employed in general, but it does demonstrate the need
for some form of safety valve to be built in, at least in terms of a contingency plan.
6.  Managing the exchange rate
Managing the  exchange rate seems  to  be the revealed preference of most  developing
countries.  The question is, how to manage a float?  The emergence of a perceived misalignment
and/or a lack of credibility of the commitment to the announced peg -- both of which can happen
in any managed exchange rate arrangement--could  trigger such large capital flows as to force the
abandonment of the peg, as in the Mexican and ERM cases.'7 To the extent that they are actively
managed, nominal exchange rates can succeed in more or less tracking the fundamentals, and
speculative attacks can be avoided. Governments can achieve enough credibility through "good
policy" to avoid such speculative attacks that are driven by self-fulfilling expectations.
One approach to this problem is to consider the exchange rate regime as consisting, at the
most general level, of a band around a moving central parity.  The decisions that need to be made
then consist of how to adjust the parity, how wide to make the band, and how to intervene within
the band.  Polar  cases can be  derived in the form  of a fixed parity with  very narrow bands
(amounting to a fixed exchange rate) and very wide bands with no intervention within the band
(amounting to fully flexible rates).  The closer the policy is to a fixed exchange rate regime, the
greater the burden on domestic interest rates and/or the money supply to adjust to shocks.
The desirability of an independent monetary policy for the domestic economy depends on
monetary policy.
17 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).
27two factors: the availability of alternative stabilization instruments (a flexible fiscal policy) and
the sources of shocks to the economy.  With a flexible fiscal policy, domestic real shocks can be
countered through fiscal adjustments, thereby diminishing the value of an independent monetary
policy as a stabilization instrument.  However, if fiscal policy is not available in the short term
(or  is  costly  to  use)  as  a  stabilization  instrument,  domestic  real  shocks  would  have  to  be
countered with greater exchange rate flexibility.
Consider, however, an alternative source of shocks that is of much concern to integrating
economies - i.e., external financial shocks, say in the form of fluctuations in world interest rates.
In this  case, exchange market  intervention policy determines the form in which  the shock is
transmitted  to  the domestic  economy.  If  world  interest  rates  fall,  for example,  and  active
(unsterilized) intervention keeps the exchange rate fixed at its central parity, domestic monetary
expansion and lower domestic interest rates will ensue--an expansionary shock.  If, on the other
hand,  the  central bank  refrains  from  intervention,  the  domestic  currency  will  appreciate  in
nominal and real terms, inflation and output growth will slow, and the domestic real interest rate
will rise--a contractionary shock.  Purely from the perspective of stabilizing domestic aggregate
demand, the appropriate intervention policy in this  case depends  on the extent to which  it is
deemed feasible or desirable to adjust fiscal policy.  If fiscal policy is literally inflexible, then the
choice confronting the monetary authorities is to live with a prospect of real appreciation brought
about either by nominal exchange rate revaluation (under no intervention), or by overheating and
domestic  inflation  (under  full  unsterilized  intervention).  Maintaining  unchanged  inflation
targets,  in this  context, would  likely  involve a  mixture  of  nominal  (and real)  exchange rate
appreciation, and lower interest rates. As embodied in the concept of the monetary conditions
28index, the contractionary effect of the appreciation would  be offset  against the expansionary
effect  of  lower  domestic  interest  rates.  In  contrast,  if  additional  fiscal  contraction  can  be
achieved, this  should reduce or  eliminate the  need for real  currency appreciation  to prevent
overheating (though not necessarily nominal appreciation).
Finally, developments in the real sector can affect monetary policy, or at least be a factor
in the determination of the stance of monetary policy.  For example, in a country which uses a
nominal income target, real growth will affect how monetary policy is conducted. In the case of
inflation targeting, real growth is highly relevant to an assessment of whether or when capacity
constraints may become binding, and hence of future price and wage pressures.  Central banks
may also not be totally oblivious to political pressures and have to occasionally take real sector
developments into account.  To maintain export competitiveness, policy might wish to keep the
nominal exchange rate such that the real exchange rate does not deviate too much from the value
determined by fundamentals, assuming that can be reasonably accurately identified.  In the case
of a high degree of capital mobility, competitiveness would have to be maintained in a setting
constrained by the interest parity condition.
V.  Short run considerations: Preventing overheating
While the large-scale capital inflows that many developing economies have experienced
have been beneficial from the standpoint  of external balance, they have also created concern
about their  potential  effects on macroeconomic  stability and competitiveness  of  the external
sector.  Key  among  these  concerns  has  been  an  acceleration  of  inflation  and  an  adverse
movement of the real effective exchange rate because of an appreciation of the nominal exchange
29rate and/or a widening of the inflation differential vis-a-vis trading partners.  The policymakers
in developing countries, faced with macroeconomic turbulence in the wake of capital flows of
varying maturity, have had to decide to what extent the required adjustment should take place
through higher domLestic  inflation and/or through appreciation of the currency.  We argue that the
answer  depends  on  the  policy  objectives  of  the  authorities,  the  exchange  rate  regime,  the
domestic institutional constraints, and, importantly, on the factors causing the inflows.
In practice, identification of the underlying causes of inflows is difficult, and a judgment
has  to  be  made  on  the  basis  of  limited  information" 8. We  focus  on  two  important policy
questions:  first,  what  indicators could  be  utilized  to  distinguish  between  possible  causes  of
capital inflows?  And second, depending on the answer to the first question, what would be the
appropriate nature, timing and sequencing of the policy actions?
1.  Macroeconomic effects of capital inflows
For the purpose at hand, the causes of capital inflows can be usefully grouped into three
major  categories: (a) whether the inflows reflect an  autonomous increase  in domestic money
demand; (c) whether they are induced by an increase in the domestic productivity of capital; and
(b) whether they are caused by external factors such as a decrease in international interest rates,
particularly U.S. interest rates.  The first two are examples of what in the literature is called a
lB The basic framework  developed  below  to address  these  two questions  outlines  some  guidelines  that  will be useful
in operational  settings  for identifying  the causes  of capital inflows  and defining  the policy  reaction  in a particular
country. Needless  to say, capital  inflows  in any specific  country  are likely  to be associated  with  a combination  of
causes,  complicating  the task of identification  and policy  formulation.  Clearly,  our categorization  of causes  and
policy  responses  will need  to be adapted  to individual  country  situations  to determine  the magnitude  and timing  of
policy  changes.
30"pull" factor and the last is an example of a "push" factor' 9.
The dominant cause of the inflow and the prevalent exchange rate regime will determine
the likely economic impact and the need, if any, for policy intervention.  Under a fully flexible
exchange rate system, capital inflows (regardless of their cause) will lead to an appreciation of
the  exchange  rate,  a  fall  in  the  relative  price  of  imported  goods  and  a  shift  away  from
consumption of nontradables -- all of which will reduce inflationary pressures.  Therefore, all
other things  equal, the higher the degree of exchange rate  flexibility, the less likely it is that
capital inflows will have an inflationary effect.  Under a managed float or a fixed exchange rate
system, the inflationary pressures created by capital inflows will depend on the underlying cause
of the inflow.  In general, if capital inflows are a response to an increase in the domestic demand
for money, they will not have an inflationary effect.  If capital inflows increase because of the
other factors --domestic productivity or external shocks-- the accumulation of foreign exchange
reserves will lead, in the absence of sterilization, to an expansion of the monetary base and result
in increased inflationary pressures.
9 These  explanations  have important  implications  for the sustainability  of capital  flows and hence  for policy  design
both at the national  and international  level. If the surge in capital  flows  has been driven  mostly  by lower
international  (US) interest  rates,  as is argued  by some  researchers,  then a reversal  in such  rates would  threaten  the
sustainability  of capital  flows." 9 By contrast,  if the magnet  for capital  flows has been  the process  of domestic
economic  reform  and productivity  enhancement  in the developing  countries  themselves,  sustainability  would  then
be a function  of the continuation  of such  reforms (see  Dailami  and Leipziger,  1997,  for further  discussion).
312.  Identifying the causes of capital inflows
Several indicators can potentially be used for the purpose of determining which of the
three factors identified above is the dominant cause of a particular capital inflow episode.  These
indicators could be divided into four categories -- asset prices, monetary and credit aggregates,
balance of payments data, and key international variables.  Clearly, the usefulness of different
domestic  financial  indicators  will  depend  on  the  economy's  institutional  structure,  and  the
sophistication of  the  data  gathering  and  statistical  reporting  systems in  place.  In  terms of
timeliness, asset prices--both domestic and international-- are likely to have the smallest lags,
with data on monetary and credit aggregates and the external accounts having relatively longer
lags.  Because of  the  reporting  lags,  detailed  data  on  the  balance of  payments  or  national
accounts cannot be employed as indicators in this context.  Furthermore, in most developing and
transition economies, GDP data is generally available only on an annual basis; in some of these
countries, monthly or quarterly industrial production figures may be available with a relatively
short lag and could possibly be used.
The behavior of the these indicators can provide some information that can potentially be
used to identify the cause of inflows. In countries with established financial and equity markets,
relative asset price  movements  could be  used  for  identification.  Assuming less  than perfect
substitutability betvveen  assets as well as less than perfect capital mobility, an increase in money
demand is likely to lead to downward pressure on bond, equity and real estate prices as agents
reallocate their portfolios, while inflows due to lower international interest rates will lead to a
bidding up of prices on real and financial assets.  The effect on asset prices of an increase in
32domestic productivity is likely to  be the same as that of a fall in international interest rates --
upward pressure on prices of equities and financial assets.
Interest rates can be useful for differentiating between capital inflows caused by "push"
and "pull" factors. Other things equal, inflows arising from "pull" factors will tend to put upward
pressure on domestic nominal interest rates while inflows due to the "push" factors will tend to
lower them.  Returns to foreign investors can also provide useful information.  Real returns for
foreign investors, which depend on the expected path of the exchange rate (together with foreign
inflation rather than domestic inflation), are likely to be higher than those available in their own
countries, in the case of "pull" factors than in the case of "push" factors.
A  money  demand-driven  capital  inflow  would  increase  money  balances  without
increasing inflation, thus raising real money balances.  The impact effect of inflows generated by
a  decrease in  international interest rates would be  an  increase in  nominal and  real balances;
thereafter, as inflation rises there will be a decline in real balances.  While the lag in the price
response may be substantial in low inflation countries, it is likely to be shorter in high inflation
countries.  In the case of a positive  shock to domestic  productivity, interest rates as well as
domestic income will increase, with the net effect on money demand depending on the relevant
elasticities. However, it is likely that desired holdings of real balances will be reduced because of
higher returns on competing assets such as equities.
Foreign  currency deposits  in  the  banking  system  should  decrease  when  there  is  an
increase  in the  domestic  demand  for money,  and possibly,  when  international interest rates
decline.  However, in the case of a domestic productivity shock, the effect is ambiguous: an
increase in the demand for domestic currency leads to a reduction while the income effect works
33in the opposite direction.
While examining the composition of capital inflows can potentially provide information
about  the  causes  of the  inflows,  it  is  often  difficult  to  distinguish  between  foreign  direct
investment flows and portfolio investment flows, especially in the short term.  In general, an
increase in money demand, or a temporary fall in international interest rates, is liable to attract a
relatively larger proportion of short-term flows; whereas an increase in the domestic productivity
of capital will attract a relatively larger proportion of foreign direct investment.  Here too, lags
may be important and they will depend, inter alia, on the regulatory environment as well as the
absorptive  capacity, of  the country.  The  initial response to  higher  domestic  productivity  of
capital may be larger portfolio flows with direct investment taking a longer time to flow in.
Although  the  indicators  described  above provide  information  for  guiding policy,  the
problem of disentangling the effects of different factors from observed indicators can be quite
complex.  Even in the simplest cases, the message from the indicators about what is causing the
capital  inflows  can  be  ambiguous.  To  eliminate  or  reduce  such  ambiguities,  additional
complementary information may be  available.  For example, the views  of market participants
could provide usefu,l  insights into factors underlying the flows. Broader changes in the economic
framework, such as economic reforms that  increase productive  opportunities  in the economy
and/or the efficiency of financial intermediation could be a driving force behind the inflows.
Finally, even when the indicators send a clear message, this needs to be evaluated against
a counterfactual. In other words, the behavior of the indicators has to be interpreted in relation to
what would otherwise have happened, but that--in practical terms--is very difficult.  Obviously,
judgment will play an essential role in devising a suitable counterfactual.
343.  Formulating a policy response
The appropriate policy response, besides depending on the causes of capital inflows, will
be  importantly determined by the degree of flexibility  provided by the  domestic institutional
structure  and  the  existing  policy  stance.  Countries  that  pursue  relatively  balanced
macroeconomic policies will clearly find it easier to fashion an appropriate policy response while
those  pursuing  unbalanced  policies  --  the  most  common  form  of  which  is  an  excessively
expansionary fiscal policy whether or not compensated by a tight monetary policy-- will be more
constrained in dealing with the disruptions caused by inflows, or outflows.
In  general,  countries  have three  main  instruments  at their  disposal  to  deal  with  the
possible  inflationary  effects of  capital inflows:  sterilization; exchange  rate  appreciation; and
fiscal policy.  The mix  of instruments used  will depend on the institutional  structure  of the
country and the history of policies pursued in the past.  The ability to sterilize the effects of the
capital inflow on the monetary base could be restricted by the lack of suitable instruments at the
disposal  of the  central  bank  and  the  state  of  development  of the  financial  markets.  Such
operations could be further constrained if the central bank's previous intervention activities have
already led to a large quasi-fiscal deficit arising out of the differences between the interest earned
on  its foreign exchange reserves  and the borrowing costs incurred to  finance  its sterilization
operations.  Although fiscal policy is an appropriate instrument for the medium-term and some
countries have adopted a tighter fiscal stance in the face of concerted capital inflows, the lags
associated with  implementation  may make it somewhat unwieldy for purposes  of short-term
demand management.  Finally, the use  of exchange rate appreciation may be  constrained by
35competitive considerations.
Temporary capital controls is a potential  instrument if the use of the three instruments
mentioned above is severely restricted and/or their effectiveness is limited 20. Two considerations
will influence the ultilization  of such controls: First, capital controls are effective only for a short
period of time and that, if kept in place for long, are likely to adversely affect the development of
the financial systerm. Second, institutional factors can sometimes be pivotal in determining an
appropriate response to capital inflows.  With macroeconomic stabilization and deregulation of
the economy, the returns  to investment may rise  sharply  and attract capital  flows, while the
banking system responsible for intermediation of these flows may still not have fully recovered
from past financial repression and weak prudential supervision.  In such circumstances, the use
of capital controls and other prudential supervision measures to direct the flow of capital into the
purchase of relatively  safe assets may be justified.  As the  quality of prudential  supervision
improves and the capacity of the banking system to handle such flows increases, capital controls
can then be progressively dismantled.
When the  capital  inflow  is associated  with  a  money  demand shock  (induced  say by
financial deregulation) no policy action is required.  In this case the expansion of the monetary
base  will  be  non-inflationary.  Intervention by  the  central  bank  in  the  money  and  foreign
exchange markets, however, may be necessary to smooth fluctuations in interest rates and the
exchange  rate.  One  possible  concern  even  in  this  situation  relates  to  intermediation  and
expansion of banking system credit that will likely accompany increased money balances.  A
poorly supervised and weak banking system could potentially lead to  excessive risk taking in
20  a collection  of recent  papers  on the effectiveness  of capital  controls,  see Leidernan and Razin,  eds. ( 1994).
36lending activities and measures may be needed to restrict bank intermediation.
When the inflow is caused by a decrease in international interest rates or by a domestic
productivity shock, it is important to distinguish between a sustained or a temporary increase in
capital inflows.  For a sustained increase, say due to an increase in the domestic productivity of
capital, policymakers would have to decide on how best to achieve the required appreciation of
the real effective exchange rate.  Adjustments in goods, factor, and asset prices will ultimately
induce such a change regardless of the exchange rate regime, and the policy response should not
in  general  inhibit  that  adjustment.  Nonetheless,  in  economies  with  flexible  exchange  rate
arrangements,  the  real  exchange  rate  appreciation  could  potentially  be  achieved  through  a
nominal  exchange rate appreciation  rather than  an inflationary  increase in the prices of non-
traded goods.  Over the medium term, a tightening of fiscal policy may be needed to  contain
inflation and prevent an excessive appreciation of the real effective exchange rate.  Experience
suggests that a tighter fiscal stance has been necessary in countries confronted with concerted
capital inflows; especially when the inflows have been large relative to the absorptive capacity.
For a temporary increase in capital flows, say due to a decrease in international interest
rates, sterilized intervention and possibly some exchange rate appreciation could be used to limit
the inflationary impact of inflows.  If feasible, sterilization of the inflows is the most appropriate
response as the intervention could be quickly reversed if offsetting capital outflows eventually
occurred,  and  there  would  be  no  adverse  consequences  for  external  competitiveness.
Adjustments  in  fiscal  policy  could  generally  be  avoided  unless  constraints  imposed  on
sterilization were severe and the economy's competitive position weak.
With  unbalanced financial  policies,  the  level  of domestic  interest rates  and  expected
37exchange rate movements are likely to be the dominant factors influencing speculative inflows.
If the high real domestic interest rates that provide a strong incentive for capital inflows are due
to  a loose  fiscal-tight monetary  policy  configuration, then making  the appropriate fiscal and
monetary  adjustments and  correcting the  policy mix is  clearly a  first  best  policy response.
However, the reduction  in interest rates, while reducing the  incentive for speculative inflows
could,  stimulate  domestic  aggregate  demand  and  increase  inflationary  pressures.  In  those
situations where  controlling inflation is an  overriding objective  and corrective action  for the
unbalanced policy  mix  is  expected, the  response  should be  similar to  that  for a  temporary
external shock, namely sterilized intervention combined with some exchange rate appreciation.
Sterilized intervention and exchange rate appreciation would clearly not be part of an effective
solution in circumstances where fundamental policy adjustments are unlikely to be forthcoming,
especially if the high domestic interest rates are driven by excessive public sector borrowing.
VI.  Conclusion
What does all this mean for South Asia? South Asia has not accepted globalization to the
same extent  that  some other regions  have.  It  is still  in  the  process  of opening  out  and  is
proceeding to do it at a pace that is relatively slow compared to many other countries.  While this
may have protected it from the vicissitudes of international financial markets, it has also not been
able to draw upon those market for the financing of its investment needs.
It is interesting to note the similarities in the policy approach among countries in the
South Asian region. Countries in the region-- perhaps because of a common colonial heritage--
have  been  pursuing  fairly  similar  approaches  to  economic  policy  despite  some  apparent
38differences.  They have all relied on capital controls and high protective tariff barriers to insulate
themselves  from  external  influences  They  continue  to  adhere  to  planning  and  despite
deregulation, privatization and liberalization, still need to go further in the direction of reducing
the size and the role of the government.  Inflation has been managed  at relatively  low levels
despite  large  fiscal  deficits  because  of  the  Figure9
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Judging from the experiences of Latin America or even East Asia, countries in the region
have been fairly stable.  While these countries have had many years with balance of payment
difficulties, i.e. with a current account deficit exceeding 2% of GDP 2 ",  the incidence of external
payments crises have been limited.  They have been relatively quick to undertake stabilization
programs to stem potential inflation or debt service difficulties.  Growth, though not spectacular
and certainly not enough to allow a rapid catch-up to the rest of the world, has been positive for
the most part and fairly steady. Despite the obvious costs to controls in terms of forgone growth,
21 In the case of Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the current account deficit has exceeded 2% of GDP a total of 17 times
over the period from 1975-1995. India, on the other hand, experienced only 5 years of large current account deficits
(over 2% of GDP) during this period.  See Table 3 in the annex for a country-by-country breakdown.
39they  have been maintained  ostensibly to  prevent a  macroeconomic crisis  or for  some socio-
political reason such as redistribution. This has led some to argue that the aversion to the risk of a
macroeconomic crisis  is evident in  policymaking in  South Asia  outweighs the weight that  is
placed on growth.
In the last few years this  has changed as the countries  in the region are increasingly
accepting openness. The conduct of macroeconomic policy in the environment of controls that
have prevailed so far has been mostly dictated by the large fiscal deficits which the monetary
regime has had to finance mainly through financial repressive policies rather than through direct
central bank financing. In the future, considerations that are laid out in this paper are therefore
likely to become increasingly relevant to how macroeconomic policy will be conducted. Recent
empirical  work on  growth would  suggest that  the  acceptance of the new  open  environment
combined with appropriate macroeconomic policy choices as outlined above and the requisite
structural changes to ensure sound governance and regulatory changes, South Asia will possibly
be able to achieve a higher growth of output than it has in the past.
40VII.  Annex
Table 3  Countries  having  large current  account  deficit (1975-1995)
(number  of years  with  current  account  deficit  greater  than  2%  of GDP)
COUNTRY  ~~~~Frequency  (numnber  of years)  Relative frequency
Argentina  10  0.53
Bangladesh  11  0.58
Bolivia  17  0.89
Brazil  9  0.45
Cameroon  17  0.94
Chile  14  0.70
China  3  0.23
Colombia  7  0.35
Costa Rica  17  0.94
Dominican Republic  18  0.90
Ecuador  15  0.79
Egypt  10  0.56
El Salvador  11  0.58
Ethiopia  13  0.72
Gabon  6  0.35
Guatemala  15  0.83
Honduras  20  1.00
India  5  0.25
Indonesia  8  0.57
Jamaica  13  0.68
Jordan  12  0.60
Kenya  14  0.70
Korea  6  0.32
Malaysia  10  0.50
Mexico  10  0.63
Morocco  13  0.65
Nepal  13  0.68
Nicaragua  16  0.89
Nigeria  6  0.33
Pakistan  17  0.89
Panama  10  0.56
Paraguay  19  0.95
Philippines  13  0.72
Singapore  10  0.50
Sri Lanka  17  0.85
Tanzania  17  0.89
Thailand  18  0.90
Tunisia  17  0.89
Turkey  8  0.40
Uganda  10  0.67
Uruguay  8  0.47
Venezuela  8  0.40
Zambia  13  0.93
Zimbabwe  9  0.50
Source: Author's  compilation based on data from the World Bank and IMF.
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Aggregate  private  capital  flows (long-term)
to developing  regions, 1980-97
Average
1980-89  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
(US$ billions)
All Developing  countries  40.4  41.8  54.7  90.2  157.3  160.8  189.2  248.1  256.1
South  Asia  2.7  2.4  1.9  3.0  6.4  9.1  6.7  8.7  9.3
Sub-Saharan  Africa  2.6  1.4  2.1  1.0  2.7  5.0  9.6  4.6  8.3
East Asia & Pacific  9.1  17.2  20.8  37.5  63.5  70.5  82.9  101.3  87.4
Europe  & Central  Asia  6.8  7.9  5.1  17.3  20.6  11.3  26.6  36.2  41.6
Latin  America  & the Caribbean  15.3  12.4  22.8  30.7  60.0  58.9  62.1  95.1  95.4
Middle East & North Africa  3.9  0.5  2.0  0.7  4.1  6.0  1.3  2.2  14.1
(percent  of total  private capital flows to developing  countries)
South Asia  6.7  5.7  3.5  3.3  4.1  5.7  3.5  3.5  3.6
Sub-Saharan  Africa  6.4  3.3  3.8  1.1  1.7  3.1  5.1  1.9  3.2
EastAsia & Pacific  22.5  41.1  38.0  41.6  40.4  43.8  43.8  40.8  34.1
Europe  & Central  Asia  16.8  18.9  9.3  19.2  13.1  7.0  14.1  14.6  16.2
Latin America  & the Caribbean  37.9  29.7  41.7  34.0  38.1  36.6  32.8  38.3  37.3
Middle East  & North  Africa  9.7  1.2  3.7  0.8  2.6  3.7  0.7  0.9  5.5
Note: 1997  data are estimates.
Source:  World Bank, Debtor  Reporting  System.
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Private  capital  flows  to South  Asia, 1990-97
(US$ billions)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
SouhAsia  2.4  1.9  3  6.4  9.1  6.7  8.7  9.3
dchich:
- FDI  0.5  0.4  0.7  1.1  1.6  2.9  3.4  4.1
- Prtfdiocapital  0.1  0  0.4  2  6.2  23  5.2  3
>  Intematiorn  issues  0  0  0.3  0.3  4.3  0.3  1.2  0.7
>LDcaleq* irvestmrt  0.1  0  0.1  1.7  1.9  2.0  4.0  2.3
-Other  pivate  1.8  1.5  1.9  3.3  1.3  1.5  0.1  2.2
Note:  1997  data  are  estirrtes.
Source:  V\bdd  Balk De[tor  Repa1ig  System
43Table 6
Foreign  direct  investment  to developing  regions,  1990-97
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994A  199  1996  1997
(US$ billions)
All Developing  countries  23.6  32.8  45.3  65.6  86.8  101.3  119.8  120.5
Sub-Saharan  Africa  0.9  1.6  1.6  1.9  3.3  3.6  3.5  3.2
EastAsia & Pacific  10.2  13.1  21.5  38.5  44.3  50.2  58.7  51.6
Europe & Central  Asia  1.1  3.5  4.7  6.5  7.2  16.5  16.0  15.9
Latin America & the Caribbean  8.1  12.5  14.4  13.3  27.5  28.8  37.5  43.0
Middle East & North Africa  2.8  1.7  2.4  4.3  2.9  -0.7  0.7  2.7
(US millions)
SouthAsia  464.0  388.9  749.2  1117.4  1583.7  2937.2  3439.9  4120.0
Afghanistan  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Bangladesh  3.0  1.0  4.0  14.0  11.0  2.0  15.0  20.0
Bhutan  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
India  162.0  74.0  277.0  550.0  973.3  2144.0  2587.0  3100.0
Maldives  5.6  6.5  6.6  6.9  7.0  8.0  9.0  10.0
Nepal  6.0  2.0  4.0  6.0  7.0  8.0  19.0  50.0
Pakistan  244.0  257.0  335.0  346.0  419.0  719.2  690.0  800.0
Sri Lanka  43.4  48.4  122.6  194.5  166.4  56.0  119.9  140.0
Note: 1997 data are estimates.
Source: World Bank,  Debtor Reporting  System.
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